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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
This brief is being submitted on behalf of a group of
economists.
1  The purpose of the brief is not to attempt to guide
the Court on legal issues but to inform it on economic ones.  To
put ourselves in the best possible position to offer the Court our
expertise, we have tried to understand, in light of the legal task
confronting the Court, where our own economic expertise might
have a useful role to play.
To that end, we understand that the lawyers who
brought this case framed the following question for the Court’s
consideration: “Whether the Clean Air Act requires that the
Environmental Protection Agency ignore all factors ‘other than
health effects relating to pollutants in the air’” when setting
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). We also
understand that this question has arisen in part because the
United States Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., whose
responsibility it is to review air quality standards issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has interpreted the
Clean Air Act as barring the EPA from even considering the
potential costs of its air quality regulations.
The merits of this legal debate between the D.C. Circuit
and the counsel who have contested the D.C. Circuit’s views are
beyond the scope of our economic expertise and hence of this
brief. Nonetheless, we respectfully offer the following
observations with hopes that they may ultimately prove useful.
The importance of this issue cannot be overstated. Both
the direct benefits and costs of environmental, health, and safety
regulations are substantial–estimated to be several hundred-2-
  
2    See Tammy O. Tengs and John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs
of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND
LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION  (Robert W.
Hahn ed. 1996). (The authors, from the Harvard School of Public Health,
calculated that improved priority setting across federal agencies could
provide either savings of $31.1 billion from current cost levels with no
additional loss of life or savings of 60,200 lives at current cost levels.)
  
billion dollars annually.  If these resources were better allocated
with the objective of reducing human health risk, scholars have
predicted that tens of thousands more lives could be saved each
year.
2 All presidents since Nixon–both Democratic and
Republican–have attempted to make environmental, health, and
safety regulations more efficient by requiring some form of
oversight attempting to balance benefits and costs. President
Reagan and President Clinton each crafted an executive order
that required an explicit balancing of benefits and costs for
major regulations to the extent permitted by law. A
comprehensive regulatory impact analysis (RIA) prepared in
conformance with President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866
was done for the ozone and particulate matter rulemaking, but
it played no official or overt part in the decision in this case
because of the D.C. Circuit’s view that costs must not be
considered. 
The issue presented in this case is of great significance
to amici curiae. In 1998, the American Enterprise Institute
(AEI) and the Brookings Institution established the AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (Joint Center) to
help improve regulation and the regulatory process. A principal
focus of the Joint Center is to analyze the economic benefits and
costs of regulations, such as the ones being considered here, and
to explore the implications of court decisions involving
regulation. The Joint Center and the economists submitting this
brief have a substantial interest in seeing that the Court-3-
  3     See Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 499 U.S. 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
  
interprets the Clean Air Act in a manner that encourages sound
decisions and in a way that is consistent with the law as
established by Congress.
To that end the Joint Center asked the economists who
are signatories to this brief to identify principles that are
appropriate for setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards
as well as for making other important regulatory decisions. The
Joint Center and these economists are accordingly submitting
this brief in the interest of improving regulatory decisionmaking
as well as making it more transparent.  All parties have
consented to the filing of this brief.
BACKGROUND
A.  Procedural History
In 1996, the EPA initiated rulemakings to revise the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone and
particulate matter (PM). The EPA prepared an RIA that
suggested that the costs of the ozone standards would exceed
the benefits while the benefits of the particulate matter standards
would exceed the costs. The Joint Center strongly favors using
such RIAs in decisionmaking and, without endorsing the quality
of all aspects of the RIA here, believes that the ozone and PM
RIA should have been considered in setting the standards. The
D.C. Circuit ruled, however, that Lead Industries barred any
consideration of costs and hence was unwilling to consider
whether a balancing of benefits and costs might provide the
requisite “intelligible principle” needed to resolve the
constitutional problems that it found with EPA’s interpretation
of the statute.
3  -4-
  
 4    See KENNETH J. ARROW, MAUREEN L. CROPPER, GEORGE C. EADS,
ROBERT W. HAHN, LESTER B. LAVE, ROGER G. NOLL, PAUL R. PORTNEY,
MILTON RUSSELL, RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE, V. KERRY SMITH, AND
ROBERT N. STAVINS, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL,
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1996)
(“Arrow et al.”); see also ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH,
ROBERT W. HAHN, ROBERT E. LITAN, PIETRO S. NIVOLA, AND
PAUL R. PORTNEY, AN AGENDA FOR FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM
(1997).
  
 5    See ARROW et al.
  
B.  Nature and Importance of Benefit-Cost
Analysis
The concern of the Joint Center along with that of the
other signatories is how analytical methods, such as benefit-cost
analysis, should be used in regulatory decisionmaking.
4  These
methods can help promote the design of better regulations by
providing a sensible framework for comparing the alternatives
involved in any regulatory choice. Such analysis improves the
chances that regulations will be designed to achieve a particular
social goal specified by legislators at a lower cost.
5 In addition,
they can make the regulatory process more transparent by
providing an analytical basis for a decision. Greater transparency
in the process, in turn, will help hold regulators and lawmakers
more accountable for their decisions. 
These analytical methods are neither anti- nor
proregulation; they can suggest reasons why it would be
desirable to have tighter or more lenient standards depending on
the results of an analysis. For example, the benefit-cost analyses
in the RIA on particulate matter and ozone could be interpreted
as suggesting that the ozone standard should not be lowered
while a new PM standard for fine particles should be introduced
to protect public health.-5-
  
6    See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1995).
  
  
7    While the definition of a “significant” regulation has changed
somewhat over time, it is generally a regulation that is expected to have
one or more of the following characteristics: an annual impact on the
economy of $100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices for
consumers or business; or significant effects on competition, employment,
investment, productivity, or innovation. President Reagan’s Executive
Order 12291 described such regulations as “major,” while President
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 described them as “significant.”  We will
use the term significant because it is used by the most recent executive
order.
  
C.  Evolution of the Use of Benefit-Cost Analysis
in Regulatory Decisionmaking
Over the past two decades, support has been growing
for the proposition that weighing of benefits and costs should
play a more central role in regulatory decisionmaking. All three
branches of government have recognized the importance of
considering benefits and costs in designing regulation.
6  
To address the increase in regulatory activity over the
past three decades, the past five presidents and President
Clinton have introduced different analytical requirements and
oversight mechanisms with varying degrees of success. A
central component of later oversight mechanisms was formal
economic analysis, which included benefit-cost analysis and
cost-effectiveness analysis. Since 1981, presidents have required
the preparation of RIAs for a predefined class of significant
regulations.
7 President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291
required an RIA for each significant regulation whose annual
impact on the economy was estimated to exceed $100 million.
President Bush used the same executive order.  President
Clinton’s and President Reagan’s executive orders require a
benefit-cost analysis for significant regulations as well as an-6-
  
8    The language in those two executive orders is very similar, suggesting
bipartisan presidential support for benefit-cost analysis.  See Executive
Order 12291, 46 FED. REG. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).  “Regulatory action
shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the
regulation outweigh the potential costs to society. . . . Regulatory objectives
shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society.”  Id. at § 2.  See
also Executive Order 12866, 58 FED. REG. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).  “In
deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and
benefits of available regulatory alternatives. . . . Further, in choosing
among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those
approaches that maximize net benefits . . ., unless a statute requires another
approach.”  Id. at § 1.
  
9    15 U. S. C. § 601 et seq.
  
10    2 U. S. C. § 1535.
  
assessment of reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned
regulation.
8 
Congress has also shown increasing interest in
emphasizing the balancing of benefits and costs in regulatory
decisions. The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996 requires agencies to submit final regulations to
Congress for review.
9 The regulatory accountability provisions
of 1996, 1997, and 1998 require the Office of Management and
Budget to assess the benefits and costs of existing federal
regulatory programs and to recommend programs or specific
regulations to reform or eliminate. The Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies, unless prohibited by law,
to choose the most cost-effective regulatory approach or
otherwise explain why they have not chosen this alternative.
10 
The courts have also been receptive to the use of
benefit-cost analysis in decisionmaking. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit
recently held in State of Michigan v. EPA, 2000 WL 180650, at
*12 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that “[i]t is only where there is ‘clear
congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost’ that we
find agencies barred from considering costs.” The court went on
to cite various cases and legal authorities for the “general view-7-
  
11    ROBERT H. FRANK AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
AND RELATIVE POSITION, (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies Working Paper 00-5, 2000), at 8.
  
that preclusion of cost consideration requires a rather specific
congressional direction.” Id. This case and others led Professors
Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein to conclude that
“[f]ederal law now reflects a kind of default principle: Agencies
will consider costs, and thus undertake cost-benefit analysis, if
Congress has not unambiguously said that they cannot.”
11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As we understand it, the D.C. Circuit did not allow the
EPA to consider the costs of complying with ozone and PM
NAAQS. As we further understand it, this legal ruling can be
overturned only by this Court. As economists, we believe that
the D.C. Circuit’s ruling not allowing the EPA to consider
important information relating to the consequences of its
regulatory actions is economically unsound. Without delving
into the legal aspects of the case, we present below why we
think the Court should allow the EPA to consider costs in
setting standards. In particular, we believe that, as a general
principle, regulators should be allowed to consider explicitly the
full consequences of their regulatory decisions. These
consequences include the regulation’s benefits, costs, and any
other relevant factors.
ARGUMENT
We approach the question presented in this case from
the perspective of the “default principle” summarized by
Professors Frank and Sunstein.
Nothing in the following statutory text of section 109(b)
of the Clean Air Act precludes consideration of costs:
National primary ambient air quality standards
. . . shall be ambient air quality standards the-8-
  
12  42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
  
attainment and maintenance of which in the
judgment of the Administrator, based on such
criteria and allowing a margin of safety, are
requisite to protect the public health.
12 
Indeed, the plain aim of this provision is protecting the “public
health,” and that aim is unlikely to be achieved without, at least,
an implicit balancing of benefits and costs.
Benefit-cost analysis is simply a tool that can aid in
making decisions. Most people do a kind of informal
benefit-cost analysis when considering the personal pros and
cons of their actions in everyday life–more for big decisions, like
choosing a college or job or house, than for little ones, like
driving to the grocery store. Where decisions, such as federal
environmental regulations, are by their nature public rather than
private, the government, as a faithful agent of its citizens, should
do something similar.
Carefully considering the social benefits and social costs
of a course of action makes good sense. Economists and other
students of government policy have developed ways of making
those comparisons systematic. Those techniques fall under the
label benefit-cost analysis. Benefit-cost analysis does not
provide the policy answer, but rather defines a useful framework
for debate, either by a legislature or, where the legislature has
delegated to a specialized agency the responsibility of pursuing
a general good, by that agency.  -9-
  
13    See ARROW et al.
  
I. A GROUP OF ECONOMISTS DEVELOPS A
CONSENSUS ON THE USE OF BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION.
Economists, other policy experts, and the regulatory
agencies themselves have produced a large literature on the
methods and applications of benefit-cost analysis. There are, and
always will be, many uncertainties and disagreements about
those methods and their application in particular cases.
Nevertheless, a wide consensus exists on certain fundamental
matters. In 1996, a group of distinguished economists, including
Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, were assembled to develop
principles for benefit-cost analysis in environmental, health, and
safety regulation.
13 Here, we summarize and paraphrase for the
Court a number of principles that we think could be helpful in
this case, which involves the review of the EPA’s NAAQS
standard-setting decisions. 
A benefit-cost analysis is a useful way of organizing
a comparison of the favorable and unfavorable effects of
proposed policies. Benefit-cost analysis can help the
decisionmaker better understand the implications of a decision.
It should be used to inform decisionmakers. Benefit-cost
analysis can provide useful estimates of the overall benefits and
costs of proposed policies. It can also assess the impacts of
proposed policies on consumers, workers, and owners of firms
and can identify potential winners and losers. 
In many cases, benefit-cost analysis cannot be used to
prove that the economic benefits of a decision will exceed or fall
short of the costs. Yet benefit-cost analysis should play an
important role in informing the decisionmaking process, even
when the information on benefits, costs, or both is highly
uncertain, as is often the case with regulations involving the-10-
  
environment, health, and safety. 
Economic analysis can be useful in designing
regulatory strategies that achieve a desired goal at the
lowest possible cost.  Too frequently, environmental, health,
and safety regulation has used a one-size-fits-all or
command-and-control approach. Economic analysis can
highlight the extent to which cost savings can be achieved by
using alternative, more flexible approaches that reward
performance.
Benefit-cost analysis should be required for all major
regulatory decisions. The scale of a benefit-cost analysis should
depend on both the stakes involved and the likelihood that the
resulting information will affect the ultimate decision.  
Agencies should not be bound by a strict benefit-cost
test, but should be required to consider available
benefit-cost analyses. There may be factors other than
economic benefits and costs that agencies will want to weigh in
decisions, such as equity within and across generations.
Not all impacts of a decision can be quantified or
expressed in dollar terms. Care should be taken to ensure
that quantitative factors do not dominate important
qualitative factors in decisionmaking. A common critique of
benefit-cost analysis is that it does not emphasize factors that are
not easily quantified or monetized. That critique has merit.
There are two principal ways to address it: first, quantify as
many factors as are reasonable and quantify or characterize the
relevant uncertainties; and second, give due consideration to
factors that defy quantification but are thought to be important.-11-
  
14    62 FED. REG. 38,856, 38,863 (July 18, 1997).
  
15    Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
  
 II. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE GIVEN THE RELEVANT
LEGAL AUTHORITIES, THE COURT SHOULD
HOLD THAT SECTION 109(B) ALLOWS
CONSIDERATION OF BOTH BENEFITS AND
COSTS WHEN SETTING NAAQS.
We believe all of the available information should be
considered in making any important decision. If costs or other
types of data are deliberately left out, the quality of
decisionmaking is likely to suffer. In particular, we make one
recommendation, closely related to the Arrow et al. principles:
The Court should allow the EPA to consider costs in setting
NAAQS, so that these costs can then be assessed along with
benefits and any other important information.
We believe that it would be imprudent for the EPA to
ignore costs totally, particularly given their magnitude in this
case. Together, the EPA estimates that those standards could
cost on the order of $50 billion annually. Not considering costs
makes it difficult to set a defensible standard, especially when
there is no threshold level below which health risks disappear.
The EPA acknowledges that exposure to ozone presents a
“continuum” of risk, as opposed to a threshold below which
adverse health effects cease to occur.
14 If the EPA is required to
set a standard “to protect the public health” with an “adequate
margin of safety,” then ignoring costs could lead to a decision
to set the standard at zero pollution.
15 That alternative, however,
would be self-defeating–it would harm public health by
threatening the very economic prosperity on which public health
primarily depends.
Once the Court allows the EPA to consider costs,
Executive Order 12866 will require the EPA to consider the full
range of benefits and costs in setting NAAQS. We think that-12-
  
considering such information could improve both the regulatory
decisionmaking process by making it more transparent and the
regulatory decision by allowing all relevant information to be
considered explicitly.
CONCLUSION
We believe that this Supreme Court case involving the
setting of National Ambient Air Quality Standards could be a
historic moment in the making of regulatory policy. This brief
has argued that it would be imprudent not to consider costs in
the setting of standards. In accordance with Executive Order
12866, we also believe that the full range of benefits and costs
should be considered in decisionmaking. Accordingly, this Court
should allow the Environmental Protection Agency to consider
costs in setting nationwide air quality standards, so that this
information can be considered along with benefits and any other
relevant factors in setting a standard.
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